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CRIMINAL LAW-THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE FELONY­
MURDER RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS AFTER COMMONWEALTH V. 
MATCHETT, 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Massachusetts cases have frequently stated that a homicide that 
occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony 
constitutes murder. l The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
has declared that "the common law felony-murder doctrine is . . . 
part of our criminal law" and that to prove a charge of murder under 
that rule, the prosecution need only "establish that the defendant 
. . . committed a homicide while engaged in the commission of a 
felony."2 Despite the seemingly forthright nature of these state­
ments, however, the supreme judicial court, on June 14, 1982, re­
versed a second degree murder conviction because it might have 
been based on the felony-murder ru1e.3 The court's holding in Com­
monwealth v. Matchett 4 represents a fundamental change in the 
treatment of felony-murder cases in Massachusetts, a change which 
virtually abrogates the felony-murder rule or at least drastically re­
stricts the scope of its application. 
In a case of first impression on the issue of the applicability of 
1. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 729 n.2, 405 N.E.2d 939, 
944 n.2 (1980); Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 420, 226 N.E.2d 200, 211 
(1967); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 411-12, 58 N.E.2d 241,246 (1944); 
Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, lSI N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926); Com­
monwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 253, 54 N.E. 551,555 (1899); Commonwealth v. 
Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36,43 (1875). See also Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 555, 
567, 141 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1957); Commonwealth v. Venuti, 315 Mass. 255, 258, 52 
N.E.2d 392, 394 (1943). 
2. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965). 
3. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 511, 436 N.E.2d 400, 412 (1982). At 
one point during jury instructions, the judge charged the jury in the following manner: 
"If you find. . . that the defendant was engaged in an attempted extortion, and that as a 
matter of probable consequence of the commission of that extortion, [the decedent) was 
killed, then you would find the defendant . . . guilty of murder in the second degree." 
Id. at 502 n.l1, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.l1. This charge was in error because it did not 
require enough of the jury. Under the Matchett holding, to find a defendant guilty of 
murder in the context of a homicide occurring during an extortion, the jury must not only 
find an extortion and a resultant death, but also that the means used by the defendant in 
the commission of the extortion demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human 
life. Id. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
4. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
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the felony-murder rule to the crime of extortion,S the supreme judi­
cial court held, in Matchett, that the felony-murder rule can be in­
voked in that context only when the jury finds that the extortion 
involved "circumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious 
disregard of the risk to human life."6 After Matchett, the finding of 
an extortion no longer proves malice in the related killing; rather, it 
raises the issue of the existence of malice. On that issue, the jury 
may consider whether the means used in the commission of the fel­
ony demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life.7 If 
the jury so finds, then, presumably, the felony-murder rule may be 
invoked and the defendant found guilty of murder. 
Having determined, however, the existence of a conscious disre­
gard of the risk to human life and thereby having determined the 
issue of malice, the jury need not then, as the court suggests, invoke 
the felony-murder rule. Because the felony-murder rule is used 
solely to achieve a finding ofmalice,8 once malice has been found by 
other means, the felony-murder rule has no function in the calculus 
of proof of the crime of murder. In the same opinion in which the 
court claimed to articulate a use for the felony-murder rule in the 
context of extortion when the jury finds a conscious disregard of the 
risk to human life, the court in fact obviated any need for the felony­
murder rule at all. 
Moreover, the implications of the holding in Matchett are not 
confined to the statutory crime of extortion. In Commonwealth v. 
Moran,9 the court extended its holding in Matchett to the crime of 
unarmed robberyIO and, possibly, beyond. I I In Moran, the court 
enunciated "the Matchett principle" as a rule of law that applies not 
only to extortion and unarmed robbery, but to any felony, statutory 
or common law, that can be committed without danger to human 
life. 12 The court justified its action on the ground that criminallia­
bility for murder is not warranted absent a culpable mental state 
with respect to the underlying homicide. 13 
Because it is possible for all felonies traditionally associated 
with the felony-murder rule to be committed without danger to 
5. Id. at 504, 436 N.E.2d at 408. 
6. Id. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
7. Id. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. 
8. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
9. 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). 
10. Id. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
II. See id. at 650-51,442 N.E.2d at 403. 
12. See id. 
13. Id. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
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human life, a strict application of the Matchett principle will forbid 
the invocation of the felony-murder rule in the trial of any homicide 
occurring during the commission of a felony unless the jury first find 
that the circumstances of the commission of the felony demonstrate 
the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk to human life. Fail­
ure to so instruct the jury appears to be reversible error. Yet, the use 
of the felony-murder rule after an express finding, on the issue of 
malice, of a conscious disregard of the risk of human life appears to 
be superfluous. While there remains in the law of homicide in the 
Commonwealth the form and appearance of the felony-murder rule, 
the Matchett principle eviscerates that rule. As a result, the status of 
the law is unclear. This casenote will analyze and clarify the Match­
ett principle and recommend that the court abrogate the felony-mur­
der rule openly. This step would bring clarity to the law and, at the 
same time, return the issue of malice to its historical status as a ques­
tion of fact for the jury, not a question of law. 14 
II. FACTS 
In a poker game in the fall of 1977, David Colvin lost approxi­
mately $1500 to Arthur Samson. ls On February 12, 1979, Samson 
hired Brian Matchett to help collect the debt. 16 The next day, Sam­
son and Matchett went to Colvin's home together, with Samson en­
tering first and Matchett following shortly thereafter.I7 Within 
minutes, the heavily-armed 18 Matchett shot Colvin twice and left 
him lying on the floor. 19 Defendant20 was charged with a number of 
crimes, the most serious being murder.21 At trial, the judge in­
14. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 

IS. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 493,436 N.E.2d at 402. 

16. Id at 493-94, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
17. Id at 495,436 N.E.2d at 403. 
18. Defendant was carrying on his person a .38 caliber revolver, a .25 caliber pistol, 
a large knife, and a pair ofhandcuffs; in addition, a sawed-off shotgun, a sword cane, and 
a large German shepherd dog were available in his car. Id at 500, 509, 436 N.E.2d at 
406, 411. There was evidence that the .38 caliber revolver was loaded, at least in part, 
with hollow point bullets. Brief for Appellant at 14, Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 
Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982); Brief for Appellee at 12, Commonwealth v. Matchett, 
386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
19. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 496-97, 436 N.E.2d at 403-04. The victim died two days 
later. Id at 497, 436 N.E.2d at 404. At trial, defendant admitted shooting the victim, but 
claimed he did so in self-defense. Id at 496, 436 N.E.2d at 404. 
20. Samson and Matchett were codefendants at trial. Samson was, however, ac­
quitted of all charges. Id at 493 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 402 n.2. The word "defendant" will 
be used herein to signify Matchett alone. 
21. Id at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. The other charges were for weapons violations. 
Id 
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structed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty of murder in 
the first degree based upon a finding of deliberately premeditated 
malice aforethought or upon the application of the felony-murder 
rule, with the underlying felony being an armed assault in a dwelling 
house with the intent to commit a felony; alternately, the jury could 
return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree based upon 
a finding of express malice aforethought or upon the application of 
the felony-murder rule, with the underlying felony being statutory 
extortion.22 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
second degree23 and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment24 
with the possibility of parole after fifteen years.25 From this convic­
tion, defendant appealed,26 asserting, inter alia, that the trial judge 
erred in instructing the jury that it could return a verdict of murder 
in the second degree under the felony-murder rule because the com­
mon law felony-murder rule is inapplicable to the statutory crime of 
extortion.27 
In a six-to-one decision, the supreme judicial court held that 
because statutory extortion can be committed in a way not inher­
ently dangerous to human life, a defendant cannot be convicted of 
murder through the application of the felony-murder rule to that 
crime unless the jury were to find that the extortion "involved cir­
cumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious disregard of the 
22. Id at 497-98, 436 N.E.2d at 404. A crime punishable by death or imprison­
ment in the state prison is a felony; all other crimes are misdemeanors. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § I (West 1970). Armed assault in a dwelling house carries a possi­
ble punishment of life imprisonment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 18A (West 
1970). Extortion by threat carries a possible punishment of 15 years' imprisonment. Id 
ch. 265, § 25. A felony-murder conviction based upon a felony punishable by death or 
life imprisonment is deemed first degree murder, id ch. 265, § I; all other felony-murders 
are second degree murders, id 
23. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. Defendant was also convicted 
of unlawfully carrying the sawed-off shotgun and the two handguns, id, in violation of 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10 (West 1970), which makes it a crime, inler alia, to 
carry firearms on the person or in a vehicle without a license. 
24. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
25. Brief for Appellee at 27, Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 436 
N.E.2d 400 (1982). Defendant was also sentenced to concurrent terms of three to five 
years for carrying the handguns without a license and five to seven years for possession 
of the sawed-off shotgun. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
26. Malcheff, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N .E.2d at 402. Defendant also appealed the 
convictions on the weapons charges. Id. Those convictions, with which this case note is 
not concerned, were affirmed by the supreme judicial court. Id. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 
412. 
27. Id at 493,498-99,436 N.E.2d at 402, 405. See infra notes 98-111 and accom­
panying text. 
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risk to human life_"28 To understand fully the implications of that 
holding, it is necessary to consider briefly the common law and statu­
tory development of the law of murder in England and the United 
States, particularly with reference to the concept of malice 
aforethought 
III. 	 A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
LAW OF MURDER 
A In General 
Murder is "homicide committed with malice aforethought."29 
Because homicide is "the killing. of a human being by another 
human being,"30 murder is the killing, with malice aforethought, of 
one human being by another.31 
"Malice aforethought," the mens rea of murder, is a legal term 
of art, the meaning of which cannot be derived from its constituent 
elements.32 To be guilty of murder, a defendant must have acted 
with malice,33 but this does not necessarily refer to any feeling of 
animosity or hostility.34 Early in the history of the English common 
law of murder, the judges understood "malice" to require an intent 
to kill.35 Over the course of time, however, the common law evolved 
as the judges sought to deem as murder conduct that resulted in 
homicide, but that occurred in a context lacking an intent to kill. 36 
At first, this requirement was met by finding an "implied intent" to 
kill;37 later, it became apparent that an actual intent to kill is not 
always required for murder.38 
28. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
29. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (3d ed. 1982) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter cited as PERKINS & BOYCE]. See a/so Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 
403,411-12,58 N.E.2d 241, 246 (1944). 
30. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra 	note 29, at 46 (footnote omitted). 
31. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 528 (1972) [hereinaf­
ter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTI] (murder is the unlawful killing of another living human 
being with malice aforethought). 
32. See Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423, 428-29, 416 N.E.2d 929, 932-33 
(1981). See a/so PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 57, 73. 
33. LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 31, at 534. 
34. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 58. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 
31, at 528-29. 
35. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra note 29, at 59. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 
31, at 529. 
36. See LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 31, at 529. 
37. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra 	note 29, at 59. 
38. Id An intent to inflict great bodily injury may constitute "malice afore­
thought," id, as would an unintentional killing during the commission of a felony, 
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With the evolution of the English common law, moreover, the 
"aforethought" component came to be less and less important. A 
"well-laid plan" was no longer required to be proven in a prosecu­
tion for murder;39 it was enough that the fatal conduct not be the 
result of afterthought.40 
As a result, it has been suggested that "malice aforethought" is a 
misleading expression whose function in the law of homicide would 
be better served by the phrase "man-endangering-state-of-mind," 
which may be taken to mean "every attitude of mind which includes 
(1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict great bodily injury, or 
(3) an intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of an unrea­
sonable human risk. . . ,or (4) an intent to perpetrate a dangerous 
felony."41 "Malice aforethought" identifies any of these four states 
of mind when it exists in the absence of justification, excuse, or 
mitigation.42 
In the common law of England, there were no degrees of mur­
der.43 The gradation of murder was a legislative development,44 oc­
curring in response to then-current ideas of crime and punishment. 
Under the English common law, murder was punishable by death.45 
Because murder can occur in a wide variety of ways, however, the 
degree of culpability of each defendant varies from case to case. 
Recognizing that different degrees of culpability warrant different 
punishments, the Pennsylvania legislature, in 1794, passed a statute 
which divided murder into two degrees, the greater of which re­
tained the punishment of death and the lesser, the punishment of life 
imprisonment.46 The "Pennsylvania pattern" is typical of murder 
statutes in the United States. It provides that: 
[A]ll murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by 
lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and pre­
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 529. See a/so Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 
(1868). 
39. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 58. 
40. fd Professors Perkins and Boyce suggest that a definition of murder as "homi­
cide committed with malice" would serve the law of homicide well. fd. at 57-58 . 
. 41. fd at 73. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 528. These types of 
murder exist today in most jurisdictions. fd. 
42. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 73-75. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra 
note 31, at 534. 
43. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 562. 
44. fd 
45. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
46. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 127. 
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of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, 
shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of 
murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree.47 
Because this type of statute concerns itself only with murder, 
that crime is the starting point in interpreting such a statute. But the 
statute itself does not define the crime; for definition, resort must be 
made to the common law.48 The statute merely provides a formula 
for categorizing common law murders49 as either first degree murder 
or second degree murder. Once those murders which constitute first 
degree murder are specified, the remainder50 constitute second de­
gree murder. 
B. The Common Law Felony-Murder Rule 
At common law, a homicide is murder "if it falls within the 
scope of the felony-murder rule_"51 At the early English common 
law, the felony-murder rule was quite literal: homicides were within 
its scope if they occurred during the commission or attempted com­
mission of a felony.52 As to causation, however, the phrase "during 
the commission of' requires more than mere coincidence of time and 
place; to invoke the felony-murder rule, it must be that but for the 
commission of the felony, the death would not have occurred.53 
In application, the felony-murder rule does not obviate the re­
quirement that the prosecutor prove malice to secure a murder con­
viction.54 Rather, the intent to commit the underlying felony serves 
47. Id (quoting Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868» (emphasis added). 
The wording is that of the March 31, 1860 Act. 
48. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 530, 568 & n.56. See a/so PERKINS & 
BOYCE, supra note 29, at 128-29. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31, 41-42. 
50. Generally, these include intent-to-kill murder which is not deliberate and pre­
meditated, intent-to-infiict-great-bodily-injury murder, murder occurring as the result of 
an act in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk, and felony-mur­
der for which the underlying felony is not listed. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 568. 
51. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 61 (footnote omitted). 
52. Id at 61-62. "[I)fone intends to do another a felony, and undesignedly kills a 
man, this is ... murder." Id at 62 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ·200­
01). See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT,supra note 31, at 545. 
The felony-murder rule is of dubious origin and history. For a brief analysis of this 
doctrine, see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689-707, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307-16 (1980), 
and the opinion of Justice Ryan at 409 Mich. at 739-43, 299 N.W.2d at 332-33 (Ryan, I., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
53. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra Dote 29, at 67. Seea/so LAFAVE & SCOTT,supra note 
31, at 545-46, 555-57. 
54. PERKINS & BOYCE,SUpra note 29, at 71. See a/so Aaron, 409 Mich. at 716-17, 
299 N.W.2d at 321. 
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to show malice aforethought.55 The subtlety of this concept is ex­
plained in this way: 
[T]he mens rea or "malice" necessary for the felony is. . . differ­
ent from the mens rea or "malice aforethought" required for mur­
der; but for certain killings the law will allow the latter to be 
conclusively proved from the former. This is not to identify them 
at all-it is merely to say that in certain cases proof of the particu­
lar state of mind required for murder will be established by the 
mens rea of certain felonies; it will be malice "implied" rather 
than "express." The difference is significant for it preserves the 
felony-murder rules [sic] as a mens rea-imposing mechanism. 56 
In this way, the rule establishes felony-murder as a fourth category 
of murder by providing a "separate definition of malice"57 in addi­
tion to an intent (1) to kill, (2) to inflict great bodily injury, and (3) to 
act in wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human 
risk.58 
The practical result of the application of the felony-murder rule, 
recognizing that the intent to commit the underlying felony estab­
lishes the mens rea of murder, is clearly seen in the context of the 
early common law. When the felony-murder rule was first con­
ceived, all felonies were punishable by death. 59 A prisoner who had 
successfully committed a felony forfeited his life upon conviction. A 
prisoner whose attempt had failed, however, was guilty merely of a 
misdemeanor6° and did not, therefore, face a death sentence. The 
felony-murder rule was designed to be used when an attempt to 
commit a felony both failed and incidentally caused a homicide.61 A 
homicide committed under such circumstances was deemed mur­
der 62 and the defendant was sentenced to death.63 It may seem, 
then, that the intended effect of the felony-murder rule at common 
55. Aaron,409 Mich. at 717, 299 N.W.2d at 321. See also LAFAVE & ScoTT,supra 
note 31, at 534. "The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon 
who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony." People v. Washington, 
62 Cal.2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 133,44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (citations omitted). 
56. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility jor the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. 
REV. 50,60-61 (1956). 
57. Aaron,409 Mich. at 716-17, 299 N.W.2d at 321. 
58. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
59. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70. "The judgment against a felon is, that 
he be hanged." Id n.78 (quoting 3 INST. ·47). See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, 
at 546 n.4. 
60. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70. 
61. Seeid 
62. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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law was to deter, by raising the specter of a death sentence should 
life be lost, would-be felons from attempting to commit any felony 
and, most particularly, to discourage attempts at those felonies 
which, by their nature, carry some risk of the loss of life. Because no 
one attempts a felony with the intent to fail, however, the felony­
murder rule could not have raised the specter of a death sentence, 
since a would-be felon necessarily courted that very punishment 
from the moment he embarked, intent on success, on a felonious 
course of action. The felony-murder rule, then, actually served to 
remove, through execution, the criminal element of English society. 
The punishment for felony-murder complemented the common law 
punishment for felony: the latter led to the execution of felons; the 
former, to the execution of those whose attempt at committing a fel­
ony caused the death of another.64 
As the common law developed in both England and the United 
States, the scope of the felony-murder rule was narrowed by judges 
who viewed the doctrine as harsh and anachronistic. The reach of 
the felony-murder rule was progressively restricted to the point that 
the rule could have been restated as: "Homicide resulting from any 
felony committed in a dangerous way is murder."65 In one English 
case,66 the trial court instructed the jury: 
[I]nstead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a fel­
ony and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be rea­
sonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and 
likely in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a 
felony which caused death, should be murder.67 
A similar result, the rejection of the idea that any and all felonies 
serve equally well to invoke the felony-murder rule, obtained in 
American case law.68 In an early case demonstrating judicial con­
cern over the scope of the felony-murder rule, the Court of Appeals 
of Kentucky presented a hypothetical felony-murder problem: 
54. What of those successful felons who faced the gallows as a result of being con­
victed of a felony? Those whose malefactions did not result in homicide were, of course, 
unaffected by the felony-murder rule; those whose conduct did result in homicide, how­
ever, did fall under the felony-murder rule. Those hitter prisoners, in facing a possible 
second death sentence for murder, were no worse off than they were upon conviction of 
the underlying felony, however: a man can be hanged to death only once. 
65. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63 (footnote omitted). 
66. Regina v. Seme, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Central Crim. Ct. 1887). 
67. ld, quoted in Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 506, 436 N.E.2d 400, 
409 (1982). 
68. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 64-65. 
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Under our statute, the removal of a cornerstone is ... a felony. 
If, in attempting this offense, death were to result to one conspira­
tor by his fellow accidentally dropping the stone upon him, no 
Christian court would hesitate to apply this limitation [that the 
rule be applied only to criminal acts whose natural tendency is to 
produce death).69 
In the United States, the felony-murder rule is, in many jurisdic­
tions, restricted in its application to those felonies which are consid­
ered to be inherently dangerous.7o Those most often categorized as 
such are burglary, arson, rape, and robbery.71 Both common experi­
ence72 and the case reports73 reflect that the commission of these 
crimes poses a grave risk to human life. At least one authority has 
concluded that, under the felony-murder rule as it is generally for­
mulated in the United States, "[hJomicide is murder if the death re­
sults from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an 
inherently dangerous felony."74 There is, however, disagreement 
over the meaning of "inherently dangerous."75 One approach, the 
"manner of commission" test, examines the facts of the particular 
69. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386,416,61 S.W. 735, 742 (1901). 
70. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 64-65. See a/so LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra 
note 31, at 547. This statement comprehends its own converse; i.e., some jurisdictions do 
not so restrict the reach of the felony-murder rule. 
71. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63. Some courts have limited the class of 
underlying felonies to those crimes which were felonies at common law; e.g., burglary, 
arson, rape, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 
547. 
72. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 63. 
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 405 N.E.2d 939 (1980) 
(breaking and entering a dwelling house in the daytime with intent to commit larceny 
and to put a person therein in fear); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Mass. 660, 433 
N.E.2d 878 (1982) (arson); Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E.2d 241 
(1944) (death resulting from a beating occurring in the commission of rape); Common­
wealth v. Venuti, 315 Mass. 255, 52 N.E.2d 392 (1943) (robbery); Commonwealth v. Le­
Page, 352 Mass. 403, 226 N.E.2d 200 (1967) (armed assault with intent to rob in a 
dwelling house). 
74. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 29, at 70. Professors LaFave and Scott note, 
tellingly, that some cases proclaim the scope of the felony-murder rule to be very general, 
while in fact the cases usually involve an underlying felony that is inherently dangerous. 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 546. They note further that a limitation on the 
felony-murder rule should be worded in terms of inherently dangerous felonies, id at 
547, rather than by naming specific felonies, since not all common law felonies (e.g., 
larceny) are dangerous, see id In their view, those felonies which are not dangerous 
should be punished as manslaughter rather than murder if the homicide occurs in an 
"extraordinary, unforeseeable" manner, id n.12; further, there are statutory felonies, as 
opposed to common law felonies (e.g., abortion and kidnapping), that should be pun­
ished as murder if they are committed in such a way that death is a foreseeable result, id 
75. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 547. 
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case, including the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
felony and the defendant's conduct, to see whether there existed a 
foreseeable danger to human life; the other approach, the "inher­
ently dangerous" test, examines the particular felony in the abstract, 
rather than with reference to the way in which it was committed.16 
C. 	 Overview of the Massachusetts Law ofMurder Prior to 
Commonwealth v. Matchett 
Murder, within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, remains 
the same as at common law: "[t]he killing of a human being, with 
malice aforethought."?? "Malice aforethought" names the mental 
states which transform homicide into murder.?8 As a requirement for 
murder, malice aforethought is satisfied by the mental element that 
accompanies homicide committed with (I) an intent to kill,79 (2) an 
intent to inflict great bodily injury,80 (3) an intent to do an act in 
wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human risk,8l and 
(4) an intent to perpetrate a dangerous felony.82 Moreover, the mal­
ice aforethought element of murder does not require the foreseeabil­
ity of the occurrence of death or great bodily injury.83 It includes all 
unlawful and unjustifiable motives84 and is "implied from any delib­
erate or cruel act against another."8s 
Murder is classified, according to its gravity, as murder in the 
first degree or murder in the second degree.86 The Massachusetts 
76. Id See also Note, Criminal Law-Felony-Murder Rule in Missouri-The Un­
derlying Felony Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous, 41 Mo. L. REV. 595, 599 n.23 (1976); 
Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 397 (1973). 
77. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 39 (West 1972). See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 686, 393 N.E.2d 820, 825 (1979); Commonwealth v. 
McGuirk, 376 Mass. 338, 344, 380 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 
(1979); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 356 Mass. 442, 444, 252 N.E.2d 880, 881 (1969); Com­
monwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass. 554, 559, 246 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1969); Common­
wealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926); Commonwealth v. 
Desmarteau, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 1,9 (1860). See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
78. Campbell, 378 Mass. at 686, 393 N.E.2d at 825. 
79. Id 
80. Id 
81. See Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass.. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899), 
quoted in Commonwealth v. Swift, 382 Mass. 78, 83, 413 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1980). See 
also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31, at 541-44. 
82. Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 728 n.2, 405 N.E.2d 939, 944 n.2 
(1980). See supra text accompanying note 41. 
83. Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423,428,416 N.E.2d 929, 932 (1981). 
84. Commonwealth v. Boyajian, 344 Mass. 44, 48-49, 181 N.E.2d 577,580 (1962). 
85. Commonwealthv. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 304 (1850). 
86. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). See also Commonwealth v. 
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murder statute87 follows, roughly, the "Pennsylvania pattem":88 
Murder in the first degree is murder committed (1) with deliberately 
premeditated malice aforethought, (2) with extreme atrocity or cru­
elty, (3) in the commission of a crime punishable with death or im­
prisonment for life,89 or (4) in the attempted commission of a crime 
punishable with death or imprisonment for life;90 all other killing 
with malice aforethought constitutes murder in the second degree.91 
Although the Massachusetts murder statute does not codify the 
common law felony-murder rule, that rule is, nevertheless, applica­
ble within the Commonwealth.92 In a prosecution for felony-mur­
der, the intent to commit the underlying felony has been held to 
supply the element of malice aforethought,93 so that a murder con­
viction could be based upon a showing that the defendant committed 
the homicide while engaged in the commission of a felony.94 Be­
cause the statute speaks only in terms of "murder," it cannot be in­
voked until a murder has been established.95 Once this has been 
done through the application of the felony-murder rule, however, 
the statute provides that those felony-murders based on an underly­
ing felony punishable with death or life imprisonment are first de­
gree murders,96 while all other felony-murders are second degree 
murders.97 
DiStasio, 298 Mass. 562, 564, 11 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1937). See supra text accompanying 
notes 46-47. 
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). 
88. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
89. All offenses so punishable are included within the scope of MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). Commonwealth v. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36,42 (1875). 
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). 
91. Id The degree of murder is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Id 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. "[W)hen a defendant by some act done 
in the commission or attempted commission of some . . . felony causes the death of a 
human being, the killing is with malice aforethought and is murder." Commonwealth v. 
Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926). 
93. Madeiros, 255 Mass. at 315, 151 N.E. at 299-300. See supra notes 54-57 and 
accompanying text. 
94. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 512, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1965). 
95. The only function of the Massachusetts murder statute is to categorize a mur­
der as murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree. See supra notes 87-91, 
46-50 and accompanying text. 
96. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). 
97. Id 
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IV. MODIFICATION OF THE FELONy-MURDER RULE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS IN LIGHT OF MATCHETT AND "THE 
MA TCHETT PRINCIPLE" 
A. Holding 
In Commonwealth v. Matchett ,98 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts faced the issue of the applicability of the common law 
felony-murder rule to a homicide occurring during the attempted 
commission of the statutory crime of extortion.99 The court quickly 
dismissed as mere dicta those prior statements found in the case re­
ports to the effect that the common law felony-murder rule loo could 
be applied as a talisman 101 to any and all felonies. 102 Stating that "[a] 
rule of law assumed, but not decided, is not binding on this 
court," 103 the court made clear its intention to be free of any false 
notions of precedent as it undertook the task of shaping the common 
law of felony-murder. 104 
Motivated by the desire to uphold what it considered to be a 
fundamental principle of criminal justice, that "'criminal liability 
for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some 
98. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
99. Id at 498-99, 436 N.E.2d at 405. Other issues raised on appeal were (I) the 
sufficiency of the evidence of an (attempted) extortion, the finding of which was a condi­
tion precedent to the use of the felony-murder rule; (2) the sufficiency of the judge's 
instruction regarding the necessity, on the issue of the existence of extortion, of finding 
that a threat was uttered; (3) the constitutionality of the felony-murder rule per se; and 
(4) the denial by the trial court of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during 
a warrantless inventory search of defendant's car. Id at 493, 498-99 & n.8, 436 N.E.2d at 
402,404-05 & n.8. None of these issues is within the scope of this casenote. Because the 
decision rested on other grounds, the third issue, the constitutionality of the felony-mur­
der rule, was not addressed by the court. Id at 508 n.17, 436 N.E.2d at 4\0 n.17. 
100. For the purpose of this discussion, "common law felony-murder rule" means 
the rule of law which deems as murder a homicide occurring during the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony. 
101. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 504-05, 436 N.E.2d at 408. "This court has never auto­
matically applied the felony-murder rule without viewing the facts of the case." Id at 
504, 436 N.E.2d at 408 (footnote omitted). 
102. Id at 504 n.13, 436 N.E.2d at 408 n.\3. 
\03. Id (citation omitted). But if. Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 
315, 151 N.E. 297, 299-300 (1926) (jury correctly charged that when a defendant, by some 
act done in the commission or attempted commission of a felony, causes the death of a 
human being, the killing is with malice aforethought and is murder). 
104. "We do not view the instant case as a departure from the Commonwealth's 
common law felony-murder rule because this court has never held that the felony-mur­
der rule was applicable to the statutory felony of extortion." Matchett, 386 Mass. at 505 
n.14, 436 N.E.2d at 408 n.14. 
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culpable mental state in respect to that result,' "105 and noting that 
the felony-murder rule is a rule of "constructive malice" in that it 
substitutes the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice 
aforethought that is an element of murder,106 the court summarily 
rejected the automatic application of the felony-murder rule to any 
and all felonies.107 In doing so, the court declared 
"For this theory to be tenable the nature of the felony must be 
such that an intent to commit that crime exhibits a conscious disre­
gardfor human life, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of con­
sequences and a mind regardless of social duty. Where, however, 
the acts which constitute felonious conduct do not possess a suffi­
cient danger to human life to justify the application of the doctrine 
of common-law felony murder, the doctrine is inapplicable be­
cause there is a failure to establish the requisite state of mind from 
the forming of the intention to commit the felony."108 
This statement foreshadowed the court's holding that, when a 
death results from the commission or attempted commission of the 
statutory felony of extortion, a conviction of felony-murder in the 
second degree lO9 is not warranted unless "the jury find that the ex­
tortion involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant's con­
scious disregard ofthe risk to human life. The crime of extortion may 
be committed in a way not inherently dangerous to human life. . . . 
We conclude, therefore, that the judge's charge 1 10 was in error." 1 1 1 
Because the trial judge did not require the jury to find a con­
scious disregard of the risk to human life before applying the felony­
murder rule, his charge constituted fundamental error, requiring a 
105. Id at 506-07, 436 N.E.2d at 409 (quoting Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the 
Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F. 565, 586 (1966». 
106. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 502, 436 N.E.2d at 407. See supra notes 54-56 and 
accompanying text. 
107. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 507-08, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
108. Id at 507, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 
278,287,309 A.2d 714, 719 (1973) (Nix, J., concurring» (emphasis added). 
109. Because the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder, the 
court found no need to discuss the applicability of the felony-murder rule to a first degree 
murder charge based on the underlying felony of armed assault in a dwelling house with 
intent to commit a felony. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 501 n.ll, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.ll. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 18A (West 1970). 
110. As to murder in the second degree based upon the application of the felony­
murder rule to the underlying felony of statutory extortion, the judge charged, "If you 
find. . . that the defendant was engaged in an attempted extortion, and that as a matter 
of probable consequence of the commission of that extortion, [the decedent] was killed, 
then you would find the defendant ... guilty of murder in the second degree." Match­
ett, 386 Mass. at 502 n.ll, 436 N.E.2d at 407 n.ll. 
111. Id at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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reversal ofjudgment and a new trial. 1 12 A reversal is required under 
such circumstances despite the possibility that the verdict of guilty of 
murder in the second degree might not have been based on the fel­
ony-murder rule at all. The judge instructed the jury both as to first 
degree murder and second degree murder. With reference to the lat­
ter, the jury was authorized to return a verdict of guilty based on 
either a finding of express malice aforethought or on the application 
of the felony-murder rule to the underlying felony of extortion, a 
crime neither punishable by a death sentence nor by life imprison­
ment. 113 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of second de­
gree murder. 1 14 From this verdict, it is impossible to tell whether the 
jury found that defendant acted with express malice aforethought or 
that he committed or attempted to commit statutory extortion and, 
in doing so, caused the victim's death. Because the jury instruction 
concerning felony-murder was deficient, the latter iof those two 
grounds was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Under the 
command of the Supreme Court in Yates v. United States,II,5 a ver­
dict must be reversed when it is supportable on one ground, but not 
on another, and it is not possible to discern the ground upon which 
the jury relied in reaching a verdict of guilty,ll6 Therefore, despite 
the possibility that the jury found express malice aforethought, the 
verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the superior court for 
a new trial. 117 
B. "Conscious Disregard oj'the Risk to Human Life" 
The most remarkable aspect of Matchett is the wording of the 
holding. In formulating a new standard under which the felony­
murder rule may be invoked in the prosecution of homicides occur­
ring during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of statutory 
extortion, the court held that the jury must "find that the extortion 
112, /d. at 508, 511, 436 N.E.2d at 410,412. 
113. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 498, 436 N.E.2d at 404. See supra note 22 and accom­
panying text. The jury was also authorized to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
first degree based on either a finding of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought or 
on the application of the felony-murder rule to the underlying felony of armed assault in 
a dwelling house with the intent to commit a felony, a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for life. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 497, 436 N.E.2d at 404. See supra note 22 and accompa­
nying text. 
114. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
115. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
116. /d. at 311-12. 
117. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. Defendant was also convicted 
of firearms violations; those convictions were affirmed. /d. at 493, 436 N.E.2d at 402. 
See supra note 23. 
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involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant's conscious dis­
regard of the risk to human l!fe. "118 That phrase is based on the 
concurring opinion of a 1973 Pennsylvania case. 119 In the context of 
that concurring opinion, the state of mind described exhibits not 
only a conscious disregard of the risk to human life, but also "hard­
ness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind re­
gardless of social duty."120 This is the common description of a 
"depraved heart," which is one of the states of mind that constitute 
malice aforethought. 121 
The Model Penal Code sheds light on the meaning of "a con­
scious disregard of the risk to human life." The Code defines as 
murder a criminal homicide committed "recklessly under circum­
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life"; 122 criminal homicide committed with ordinary recklessness is 
simply manslaughter. 123 Recklessness presupposes an awareness 
and conscious disregard of a substantial homicidal risk. 124 To deter­
mine whether the defendant's recklessness is sufficient to support a 
conviction of murder rather than manslaughter, the key, under the 
Model Penal Code, is whether the circumstances of the crime indi­
cate that the defendant, in consciously disregarding the risk to 
human life, acted with "extreme indifference to the value of human 
life."125 If so, the defendant is guilty of murder; if not, he is guilty 
only of manslaughter. Again, in context, the phrase upon which the 
Matchett court drewl26 indicates extreme indifference to the value of 
human life and, hence, murder. 127 
\18. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (emphasis added). 
119. Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 287, 309 A.2d 714, 719 (1973) (Nix, 
J., concurring). 
120. Bowden, 456 Pa. at 287, 309 A.2d at 719 (Nix, J., concurring). See supra text 
accompanying note 108. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment I (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1962). 
121. See LAFAVE & Scan, supra note 31, at 542. 
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 21O.2(1)(b) (1962). 
123. Id. § 21O.3(1)(a). 
124. Id. § 210.2 comment 4. 
125. Id. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21. 
127. The Model Penal Code departs from the traditional felony-murder rule. 
Under the Code, criminal homicide is presumed to be committed recklessly under cir­
cumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life if the actor is 
engaged in, or is an accomplice in, the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or fiight 
after committing or attempting to commit, robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by 
force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape; i.e., criminal 
homicide occurring under such circumstances constitutes murder. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 21O.2(1)(b). Even with this presumption, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion 
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The court forced the conclusion that "a conscious disregard of 
the risk to human life" refers to malice when it wrote that "the 
means utilized to effect the extortion could be considered by the jury 
on the issue of malice, i.e., whether these means and the methods 
used by the defendant demonstrated a conscious disregard of the risk 
to human life."128 This statement is important for two reasons. 
First, on its face, it allows a jury to find malice by finding a conscious 
disregard of the risk to human life; i.e., the jury can infer malice 
from the means used by the defendant in committing the extortion 
by finding that those means demonstrate a conscious disregard of the 
risk to human life: This the jury could not do unless "conscious dis­
regard of the risk to human life" represents a state of mind that coin­
cides, at least to some degree, with the state of mind known as 
"malice aforethought." Second, if it is possible to infer a state of 
mind less culpable than malice from means that demonstrate a con­
scious disregard of the risk to human life, then the invocation of the 
felony-murder rule under those circumstances would violate the 
spirit of the Matchett holding because doing so would cause a find­
ing of criminal liability for murder despite the absence of a culpable 
mental state with respect to the underlying homicide. 129 Therefore, 
the phrase "conscious disregard of the risk to human life" must rep­
resent a state of mind that is not merely coincidental to some degree 
with the state of mind known as "malice aforethought," but a state 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly and with extreme indiffer­
ence to the value of human life. The jury may regard the facts giving rise to the pre­
sumption as sufficient evidence of the required culpability unless the court determines 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives that conclusion. The presumption may, of 
course, be rebutted by the defendant or may simply not be followed by the jury; if so, the 
defendant may be liable for manslaughter or negligent homicide. If the presumption is 
not rebutted and if the jury finds, with or without its aid, that the requisite extreme 
indifference in fact existed beyond a reasonable doubt, then the appropriate conviction is 
for murder. 
128. Matchell, 386 Mass. at 511, 436 N.E.2d at 412. To prepare the jury for that 
task, a judge might recite the following instruction: 
If you find that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the statutory 
crime of extortion, and, as a consequence of having done so, the decedent was 
killed, then you must decide whether that killing was murder. Murder is "the 
killing, with malice aforethought, of one human being by another." On the 
issue of malice aforethought, you may consider the means utilized to effect the 
extortion; that is to say, whether the means and methods used by the defendant 
demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life. If you find that the 
means and methods used by the defendant to effect the extortion do in fact 
demonstrate a conscious disregard of the risk to human life, you will have 
found that the defendant acted with malice aforethought and you will, there­
fore, return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. 
129. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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of mind that is in fact synonymous with "malice aforethought." This. 
conclusion demonstrates, again, the redundant nature of the holding 
in Matchett. Matchett requires that before the felony-murder rule 
may be applied, the jury first find that the defendant acted in con­
scious disregard of the risk to human life.l3O Making such a finding, 
however, is tantamount to finding that the defendant acted with mal­
ice. Once the jury has found malice aforethought, there is no need to 
invoke the felony-murder rule, since that rule is a "mens rea-impos­
ing mechanism"131 and malice is the mens rea of murder.!32 Having 
shown a homicide accompanied by "conscious disregard of the risk 
to human life," the prosecutor has made out a case of murder; he 
need not then ask the jury to return a verdict of guilty through the 
application of the felony-murder rule. 
C. 	 The Matchett Principle Extended to Crimes Other Than 
Extortion 
At best, the holding in Matchett is obscure; at worst, it is self­
contradictory and represents a redundancy in the law of homicide. 
If the holding were to be restricted to homicides occurring during the 
commission of the statutory felony of extortion, its effect would be 
more academic than practical because it is not to be expected that 
extortion will often lead to homicide. 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Moran, \33 decided five months 
after Matchett, however, the supreme judicial court extended the 
Matchett principle to the crime of unarmed robbery.l34 Moran and 
an accomplice robbed their victim after leaving a bar in which the 
three of them had been drinking together. 135 The intoxicated victim 
suffered blows to the head during the course of the robbery, was 
stuffed into the cab of his pickup truck, and asphyxiated after aspi­
rating his own vomit.!36 While reaffirming that the felony-murder 
rule is "the law of this Commonwealth,"!37 the supreme judicial 
court held that because unarmed robbery is not inherently danger­
ous, the felony-murder rule is not applicable to that crime unless 
"the jury find from the circumstances of the felony that the defend­
130. 	 Matchell, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 410. 
131. 	 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
132. 	 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
133. 	 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). 
134. 	 fd. at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
135. 	 fd. at 645, 442 N.E.2d at 400. 
136. 	 fd. at 645-46, 442 N.E.2d at 400. 
137. 	 fd. at 648, 442 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted). 
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ant consciously disregarded [the] risk to human life."138 
Having, in Moran, extended the Matchett principle to unarmed 
robbery, it appears that the supreme judicial court will restrict the 
scope of the felony-murder rule whenever it can. Particularly vul­
nerable to the court's analysis will be those felonies which are not 
"inherently dangerous to human life"I39 and those which "can be 
committed without danger to human life."I40 While the Moran 
court did not state that an unarmed robbery accompanied by manual 
blows to the head, such as that which occurred in Moran, can be 
conceived of as being not inherently dangerous to human life, the 
court did state that unarmed robbery per se is not inherently danger­
ous and that the felony-murder rule may not be invoked in the pros­
ecution of that crime unless the jury were to find from the 
circumstances that the defendant consciously disregarded the risk to 
human life. 141 If unarmed robbery per se is not inherently danger­
ous to human life, there is no reason not to believe that armed rob­
bery accomplished by intimidation rather than by force can be 
committed without posing an inherent danger to life. Moreover, it is 
conceivable that the other felonies traditionally associated with the 
felony-murder rule, burglary, arson, and rape, can also be commit­
ted without danger to human life. In the trial of a homicide associ­
ated with any of these crimes, the Matchett principle would require 
that the jury first find that the defendant consciously disregarded the 
risk to human life in committing the underlying felony before the 
jury could apply the felony-murder rule. 
That requirement effectively abrogates the felony-murder rule 
by subsuming what otherwise would be the felony-murder theory of 
a prosecution into a conventional murder theory under which the 
jury infers malice from the means used by the defendant in commit­
ting the underlying felony by finding that those means display a con­
138. ld at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. "The Matchell principle" was enunciated by 
the court in the following way: 
The holding in Matchell was based on our recognition that extortion can 
be committed without danger to human life and on the principle that "criminal 
liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some 
culpable mental state in respect to that result. ..." 
Though Matchell involved only felony-murder based on extortion, its prin­
ciple applies as well to felony-murder based on unarmed robbery. Unarmed 
robbery is not inherently dangerous to human life. 
ld at 650-51, 442 N.E.2d at 403 (citations omitted). 
139. See id at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403; Matchett, 386 Mass. at 508, 436 N.E.2d at 
410 (citation omitted). 
140. Moran, 387 Mass. at 650, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
141. ld at 651, 442 N.E.2d at 403. 
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scious disregard of the risk to human life. The felony-murder rule is 
abrogated because, under the requirements of Matchett, the role that 
it might have played in the prosecution, that of implying malice on 
the part of the defendant, is rendered unnecessary: Once malice has 
been established by a finding of a conscious disregard of the risk to 
human life, murder is proven; thereafter, there is no need to invoke 
the felony-murder rule. Yet, in establishing this requirement in 
Matchett and Moran, the court, at the same time, declared the fel­
ony-murder rule to be "the law of this Commonwealth."142 
If it is the desire of the supreme judicial court to abrogate the 
felony-murder rule, the court should do so openly. With the advent 
of the Matchett principle, the felony-murder rule continues to exist 
in form but not in substance. The Matchett principle adds nothing 
other than confusion to the law of homicide. Other states have 
openly abrogated the felony-murder rule. 143 In its modern statutory 
analysis of the felony-murder rule, Hawaii declared that total abro­
gation, as opposed to judicial limitation of the scope of the felony­
murder rule, is the wiser course: 
Even in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule is still ob­
jectionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, neg­
ligent, or reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without 
more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of 
some defined class. Engaging in certain penally-prohibited be­
havior may, of course, evidence a recklessness sufficient to estab­
lish manslaughter, or a practical certainty or intent, with respect to 
causing death, sufficient to establish murder, but such a finding is 
an independent determination which must rest on the facts of each 
case. . . . There appears to be no logical base for the felony-mur­
der rule which presumes, either conclusively or subject to rebuttal, 
culpability sufficient to establish murder. l44 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the holdings in Commonwealth v. Matchett 145 and 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 146 the felony-murder rule is, at present, in 
a state of de facto abrogation in Massachusetts. The de jure abroga­
142. Moran, 387 Mass. at 648, 442 N.E.2d at 402 (citations omitted). 
143. For a general discussion of the modem treatment of the felony-murder rule, 
see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 699-707, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312-16 (1980). 
144. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-701, commentary at 346-47 (1976) (footnotes and 
citation omitted). 
145. 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982). 
146. 387 Mass. 644, 442 N.E.2d 399 (1982). 
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tion of the rule, therefore, would not change the substance of the 
law, but would simply clarify the law's uncertain status. Since "a 
conscious disregard of the risk to human life" indicates, in the con­
text of the opinion upon which the supreme judicial court drew, ex­
treme indifference to the value of life, the prosecutor would be free, 
even after an express abrogation of the felony-murder rule, to prove 
malice aforethought, with respect to a homicide that is the result of 
the commission or attempted commission of a felony, by showing, 
from the circumstances of the felony, that the defendant acted in 
conscious disregard of the risk of that result. This would return to 
the jury its historical function of determining the existence of malice 
directly,147 rather than indirectly through the application of the fel­
ony-murder rule. 148 
Michael G. Rikard 
147. PERKINS & BoycE, supra note 29, at 73-74 (malice is a psychical fact to be 
determined by the jury). 
148. One functional aspect of the felony-murder rule would survive the general 
abrogation of the rule: upon a finding that a murder occurred in the context of a felony, 
the degree of murder would be fixed by statute depending on the type of felony. Those 
murders occurring in the context of a felony punishable with death or imprisonment for 
life would constitute murder in the first degree; all other murders would be murder in the 
second degree. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § I (West 1970). 
